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A wide variety of intergroup conflicts exist, many of which are
peacefully resolved by negotiations aimed at satisfying the de-
mands of the opposing parties. However, in some cases a dialo-
gued settlement is impossible, and instead the groups involved
turn to the use of violence.
In its most extreme form, political violence means physically
eliminating one’s adversaries. The enormous impact caused means
that the perpetrators have an even greater epistemic need to ex-
plain and justify their acts (Bar-Tal, 2000; Sabucedo et al., 2001).
These explanations construct a version of the events which is in
their favor, and allows them to maintain a positive image (Petti-
grew, 1979; Sande et al., 1989)
However, the use of violence as a type of political action initially
produces widespread rejection by society. Therefore the groups in-
volved are likely to make concerted efforts to legitimize their actions,
because, as Apter (1997) noted : «The key to political violence is its
legitimacy» (p. 5). When violence is legitimized, it is then possible
to maintain a positive self-image, and to obtain the support of the pu-
blic which is a hugely important factor in the development of the
conflict (Snow, Hunt and Benford, 1992). It is therefore necessary to
understand the different arguments which groups use to justify vio-
lence. These arguments must refer to the most important aspects of
the process: the existence of a cause which justifies the conflict and
then leads to violence, the group’s degree of responsibility for these
actions, the nature of the enemy, and the actual situation of the group. 
Any group which finds itself in a conflictive situation must de-
fend the legitimacy of its position (Eldredge, 1979), by referring
to other beliefs and arguments. One of the most important is the
identification of who is responsible for the violence. Attribution
studies have repeatedly shown that when we are confronted with
undesired situations such as violence, there is an external attribu-
tion of responsibilities (Hewstone, Jaspars and Lallje, 1982, Tay-
lor and Jaggi, 1974). The group is obliged to create a version of the
facts where the enemy is the main cause of the violent situation.
This means that when they refer to acts of violence they have ca-
rried out, they are presented as the results of a process initiated by
their adversaries, or as acts of legitimate defense.
Another process which justifies violence is the de-legitimi-
zation of one’s opponents (Stagner, 1967; White, 1970). One of
the elements that contributes to this process is dehumanization,
which involves defining the enemy using a series of ‘inhuman’ fe-
atures, such as cruelty or lack of compassion. 
Adversaries may also be delegitimized by associating them
with other groups with negative values, such as Nazis, fascists, or
imperialists, or by associating these terms with the groups or so-
cial organizations to which they belong (Bar-Tal, 1998). In either
case, the objective is not only to discredit out-groups, but also to
establish a clear dividing line between the in-group and its adver-
saries. Struch and Schwarz (1989) demonstrated that intergroup
violence increases when there is a stronger perception of the boun-
dary of impermeability, and when there is an increased use of
dehumanization.
Violence against the out-group may therefore be fully justified
if it is defined as being ‘inhuman’, and because its nature and mo-
dus operandi may pose a threat to the security and/or progress of
the group. World history offers numerous examples of violence
against adversaries which took place after episodes of de-legitimi-
zation. 
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Whatever the situation, the actual delegitimizing strategy used
will be influenced by the nature of violence itself. Committing an
act of aggression against someone already involved in violent ac-
tions is not the same as violence against an innocent person; in this
case, a specific strategy of delegitimization is often used. If the
victim is judged to be ‘guilty’, the aggressive group will offer re-
latively detailed information about their profession and persona-
lity. However, if the victim is ‘innocent’, a different technique ne-
eds to be used, such as depersonalization.
The use of violence by a group does not prevent it from crea-
ting a discourse of victimization, where it is the victim of a con-
flict caused by an aggressor. According to Bar-Tal (1998), the dif-
ferent groups engaged in a conflictive situation attempt to prove
that they alone are the real victims, as this is essential to obtain
support from the international community. Victimization also ma-
kes it possible to present the use of violence in a more socially ac-
ceptable manner: it is not easy to question the rights of a victim to
protect himself from aggression. 
This feeling of victimization may lead to what Mack (1990) ca-
lled «the egoism of victimization», the inability of one group to
sympathize with the victims of another because of its own trau-
mas. It may be expressed differently if the group attacks an inno-
cent person, and there is a widespread public outcry. In these cir-
cumstances, if they wish to maintain a positive social image and
the support of the population, it is not possible to totally ignore the
suffering of the out-group. 
These different beliefs aim to present the enemy as being
wholly responsible for situations of violence, and one’s own group
as the victim rather than the executioner. A key role is played in
this task by sections of the media which share the beliefs of the ag-
gressive group, and whose duty is to communicate these beliefs to
their sympathizers. By offering particular representations of rea-
lity (Gamson, 1988) they contribute to supporting a discourse
which justifies violence.
In this study we will analyze how one publication which was
sympathetic towards a terrorist group justified an act of violence
against an innocent man. We will compare how this newspaper
and two others from Spain’s Basque Country used the variables
which legitimize political violence to create their own version of
the events surrounding the kidnap and murder of Miguel Angel
Blanco by the Basque terrorist movement ETA. Miguel Ángel
Blanco was a local councilor of the Partido Popular (PP)1 in Er-
mua, a small town in the Basque Country, and his death provoked
a tremendous outcry throughout Spain. 
Each of these newspapers would have been expected to present
the facts according to their view of the political situation in the
Basque Country. We can propose the following hypotheses for the
treatment given by the newspaper which supported ETA: a) it
would present the Spanish government as the guilty party, respon-
sible for the kidnap and murder carried out by ETA; b) it would at-
tempt to dehumanize the victim, associating him with a political
group which it held responsible for the situation, and offer no per-
sonal information; c) it would emphasize that suffering of the in-
group, the Basque people, was the crux of the matter.
This article considers three points which are of particular inte-
rest. Firstly, it analyses the beliefs which serve to legitimize poli-
tical violence in a real context. We are not dealing with an artifi-
cially created situation, in which references to violence may seem
more or less credible or real. Secondly, this investigation was ma-
de by analyzing an act of violence committed against an innocent
person, and in an atmosphere of widespread social opposition.
This makes it possible to see how the legitimizing discourse of
violence was adapted to this situation. Thirdly, it shows how the-
se beliefs were analyzed in the media. This final point is particu-
larly relevant if we consider the important role played by the me-
dia in creating and communicating representations of reality. 
Before focusing on the main subject of this article, we should
first examine the events and the context in which they took place. 
Context: ETA and the kidnap and murder of Miguel Ángel Blanco 
ETA is a terrorist organization which was founded in 1959. It has
nationalist and socialist ideologies, and its main objective is the cre-
ation of an independent Basque state formed by the Basque provin-
ces of Spain and France. Its struggle in the 1960’s and 70’s against
Franco’s dictatorship won it the support and sympathy of a large
number of citizens who were opposed to the authoritarian regime of
the period, both in the Basque Country and in the rest of Spain. 
Once democracy returned to Spain, one sector of ETA changed
direction, whereas another decided to continue with its strategy of
violence. Since then, there has been a significant increase in both
the amount and severity of violence carried out by ETA (Reinares,
1996; Llera, 1993). In the mid-1970’s, some writers started to re-
fer to the acts of ETA as terrorism (Wieviorka, 1997).
Groups opposed to ETA carried out other acts of violence in the
Basque Country, and in some cases it was proved in court that the
police and government had been directly involved. However, the-
se groups ceased all activities several years ago.
From 1968 until the time of Miguel Ángel Blanco’s kidnap-
ping, violence by ETA had caused more than 800 deaths, half of
which were civilians. 
In the months prior to the kidnapping of Miguel Ángel Blanco,
ETA and other similar political groups had begun a campaign
pressurizing the Spanish government to move jailed members of
the organization to prisons in the Basque Country. As part of this
strategy they had kidnapped a Prison Service Officer, José Anto-
nio Ortega, who was held hostage for 532 days until his release by
security forces on the 1st july 1997. 
On the 10th july 1997, ETA kidnapped Miguel Ángel Blanco,
and threatened to kill him within 48 hours if the Spanish govern-
ment did not immediately start the process of moving ETA priso-
ners to Basque jails.
ETA’s response produced a massive public outcry. There were
hundreds of demonstrations throughout Spain, including the Bas-
que Country, with millions of people demanding Blanco’s release. 
This mass wave of repulsion was the result of several factors. One
was the growing awareness of the population, particularly in the Bas-
que Country, of the need to protest against violence, and to firmly
oppose the methods used by ETA (Funes, 1998). Secondly, the natu-
re of the crime: the killing of an innocent and completely defenseless
person at a fixed time (Sabucedo, Rodríguez and López, 2000). 
Despite these protests, ETA carried out its threat, and shot Mi-
guel Ángel Blanco on the 12th july 1997, mortally wounding him.
This led to further massive public outcry against ETA and all of
the groups and organizations connected with it.
Method
In order to explore the issues covered in this article, we analy-
zed three newspapers. One of them, ‘Egin’, sympathizes with
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ETA, and so its opinions and arguments may be considered as re-
presentative of the sectors which support the group. In guarantee a
clear understanding of the way events were covered by Egin, we
compared it with reports from other newspapers. We chose two:
‘Deia’, which supports the PNV (Basque Nationalist Party, the
most popular nationalist party in the region); like ‘Egin’, it is in fa-
vor of Basque nationalism, although it is much less radical, and
decries the use of violence. The other is ‘El Correo Español-El
Pueblo Vasco’, the most widely read paper in the region which do-
es not share the objectives of Basque nationalism.
We analyzed the editorials, front-page stories and other articles
from these three newspapers which reported these events and other
acts of violence. We collected all of the articles which referred to
the underlying motives, or to the victim himself. We analyzed the
period between the eleventh and thirteenth of July 1996, as this was
when the different political parties made their opinions public, allo-
wing the situation to be interpreted from its different perspectives.
Once we had obtained these articles from the three newspapers,
we started to compare how they had dealt with the most important
issues. In doing so, we observed two interesting points: firstly, that
there were differences in the way they had dealt with the facts su-
rrounding the incident, and secondly, the way in which the events
and the victim were described by the newspaper which sympathi-
zed with the terrorists.
Analysis
By analyzing the way the different newspapers covered the kid-
napping and murder of Miguel Ángel Blanco, three important factors
became apparent: who was responsible for the situation, the method
used to describe the victim, and the situation of the aggressive group. 
We shall now explore how these publications, particularly
Egin, dealt with these issues. 
a) Attributing responsibility to the opponent
We shall see how Egin and the other two newspapers dealt with
the subject of attributing responsibility for the crime. Table 1
shows their front-page headlines. 
Here we see how Egin directed its readers’ attention to the go-
vernment’s attitude, and made it the center of the problem, while
ETA remained in the background. Reference was only made to
ETA on the 13th july, stating that they shot the councilor, although
only after reporting that the government had not changed its posi-
tion. The construction of the sentence turns the shooting into a di-
rect consequence of government inaction.
However, the other two newspapers directly attribute responsi-
bility for the crime to ETA. 
Table 2 shows the parts of the editorial section which refer to
the attribution of responsibilities.  
The attribution of responsibilities presented by each of the
newspapers also becomes clear in analyzing these editorials. Egin
supports ETA’s demands and accuses the government and other
political parties of not acting on them, and therefore of being res-
ponsible for the situation. The other two newspapers refer to ETA
as being wholly responsible. 
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Table 1
Front page headlines from the 3 newspapers examined
11th july
EGIN
Quoting the Interior Minister: «The government will stand by its obligations».
DEIA
«ETA kidnaps a P.P. councilor from Ermua and threatens to kill him in 48 hours».
EL CORREO ESPAÑOL-EL PUEBLO VASCO
«ETA kidnaps a PP councilor and threatens to kill him».
12th july
EGIN
«The government prepares for tragic developments».
DEIA
«Don’t kill him».
EL CORREO ESPAÑOL-EL PUEBLO VASCO
«Unprecedented demonstrations. Society reacts en masse to ETA’s threat, in an attempt to
save the councilor’s life ».
13th july
EGIN
«The government took no action, and ETA shot the PP councilor».
DEIA
«ETA kills Miguel Angel».
EL CORREO ESPAÑOL-EL PUEBLO VASCO
«Devastation. ETA carries out its threat and leaves Blanco mortally wounded in a valley
in Lasarte».
Table 2




There was no editorial dedicated to events.
DEIA
«… Nobody can justify this kind of act, and those responsible for this kidnapping are
wholly responsible for this and whatever they may do in the coming hours».
EL CORREO ESPAÑOL- EL PUEBLO VASCO
«The terrorist organization ETA yesterday kidnapped Miguel Angel Blanco… «The short
period of time offered to the Government in order to agree to an unthinkable condition




«Aznar’s government has entrenched itself in the intransigence of ‘no’.» »We are in a cri-
tical situation. ETA has asked for the law to be upheld, and the political parties can only
think about toughening a discourse plagued with belittlement, and calling for a demons-
tration». «Making a demonstration of recognizing the rights which help prisoners is by no
means giving way to any kind of blackmail».
DEIA
«… Words sprout forth from different perspectives and enlighten human sensitivity in fa-
vor of all innocent victims. In their honor, in the name of human life and liberty, we are
obliged to plead that the kidnappers do not carry out their threat to kill Miguel Angel
Blanco, and release him unconditionally».
EL CORREO ESPAÑOL-EL PUEBLO VASCO
«The burden of the crime lies only with its authors and instigators, and in the no way the
legitimate government, which has not only the right, but also the legal and moral obliga-
tion to watch over the dignity of the State, the wishes of the society which has given it le-
gitimacy through the vote, and the coexistence of the principles of liberty and legality».
It is clear that while Deia and El Correo Español-El Pueblo
Vasco directly blamed ETA for the killing, Egin carried out an ex-
ternal attribution of responsibilities, allowing them to accuse the
Government and not the terrorist group. 
b) De-legitimization and depersonalization of the victim
Another of the processes used to justify violence was delegiti-
mization of the enemy. It is important to analyze this issue, as in
this case we are dealing with an innocent victim, and it is interes-
ting to examine the type of data and information produced. Table
3 shows the way in which the different newspapers handled the
subject, and the way in which they referred to the victim. 
Here we can see that Egin did not choose a strategy whereby it
disqualified the victim’s personality: the very nature of Miguel
Angel Blanco’s personality and political status made this impossi-
ble. Instead, it chose to withhold all personal information and me-
rely describe him as a ‘PP councilor’. This becomes even more ap-
parent if we examine reports in other newspapers. In Deia and El
Correo Español-El Pueblo Vasco, numerous photos were publis-
hed of Blanco and his family, together with in-depth articles about
different aspects of his life.
Egin therefore attempted to depersonalize the victim by con-
verting him into a component element of a political party which it
held responsible for the majority of the grievances of the group it
supported. Faceless, and without any biographical references, an
individual simply ceases to exist, or becomes a distant point on the
horizon. This prevents the population from having any type of
psychological identification with the hostage. By using this stra-
tegy of ‘covering up’ or de-personalizing the victim, Egin attemp-
ted to reduce the emotional impact of violence against a person li-
ke Blanco. It simultaneously attempted to delegitimize Blanco by
identifying him as a representative of the political group which it
considered to be the enemy. 
c) Victimization and Asymmetrical evaluation of suffering
Finally, we shall explore how Egin constructed the discourse of
victimization which it used to legitimize Blanco’s murder. 
On the 11th july, when the kidnapping was first reported, Egin
published an article entitled «Reflections». This article did not di-
rectly refer to the crime, although it fits within the same context
due to its subject matter and the time of its appearance. We have
included some selected paragraphs.
The article contained a series of editorials about the two recent
ETA kidnappings of Cosme Declaux and José Antonio Ortega,
and the arrest of Mari Atxabal by Spanish security forces in june
1996. It reads: «Cosme Declaux, kidnapped by ETA, was in the
hands of the organization for more than 200 days. His kidnapping
comes to an end, he walks out on his own, arrives home, has a sho-
wer, greets his neighbors, chats to his family, gives declarations to
a judge, gives a press conference and goes on holiday.
«José Antonio Ortega, kidnapped by ETA for more than 500
days, ends his kidnapping, walks home, has a shower and greets
his neighbors, chats to his family, declares before a judge, and
gradually returns to normality.
«In june 1997, Mari Atxabal returns home temporarily, not on
foot, as she has been in bed more than one month, cannot get up
or fend for herself, will have to be medicated, or rather drugged,
for months, and thus the future of her physical and psychiatric he-
alth is uncertain, with loss of consciousness and reality on a ne-
arly daily basis.
«It is not possible to deny the distress suffered by those who have
been kidnapped, nor would I wish to do so; I imagine that they have
had to be very strong and in thoroughly good shape, something which
maybe they have not managed to do, and will take them a long time
to recover. All I would say is that torture may adopt many guises, and
they may have been tortured in one way or another, and I propose that
we carry out an exercise in comparison and analysis between them:
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Table 3
News reports about the victim
11th july (the day after the kidnapping)
EGIN 
Published a photo of Blanco (on page 10).
Dedicated one page (p. 10) to the news.
When they mentioned his name, they usually did so associating him with the PP.
The only reference to Miguel Angel Blanco is the following: «Miguel Angel Blanco was
born in 1968 in Ermua and lives at the family home in Iparraguirre Street, together with
his parents and sister. An economist by profession, Miguel Angel Blanco’s political expe-
rience began in 1995, when he presented himself in third place for the PP candidature in
Ermua. He had previously worked on the executive committee of the PP in Bizkaia».
DEIA 
Published two photos of Miguel Angel Blanco, one on the front page. 
Dedicated three pages to the story.
On one of these pages, it dedicated a 59-line column in its interior to the hostage’s perso-
nal and family life. The column was entitled: «Miguel Angel Blanco, the economist who
worked as a laborer». Two sections within this column were entitled «The grief-stricken
parents» and «Not a professional politician». Some of the biographical elements offered
included: «He worked for two years as a laborer for his father. He is single, although he
has had a girlfriend for seven years. His hobbies include music (playing drums in a local
band in Ermua… which played at a wedding in the town ) and sport. His father works as
a laborer».
EL CORREO ESPAÑOL-EL PUEBLO VASCO
Published two photos of Blanco, one filling the front page, and another of his father. 
Dedicated five other pages to the subject.
Featured a 104-line column entitled «the councilor who loves drumming». In bold text it
states: «Miguel Angel Blanco divides his life between his job, his girlfriend and occasio-
nal work in Ermua’s Town Hall. The neighbors of ETA’s latest victim describe him as a
‘noble, straightforward and friendly’ young man». The text also mentions that he was
born into a humble family, that he helped out his father, a builder, and that he was mem-
ber of a pop group which played at local festivals.
12th july (at 4 o’clock, ETA’s deadline would expire, and new demonstrations had be-
en called in the Basque Country and Spain demanding his freedom.)
EGIN 
Did not publish any photos of Miguel Angel Blanco.
Dedicated five internal pages to the news.
Did not give any personal information about the victim. 
DEIA  
Published three photos of Miguel Angel Blanco, one on the front page. There was also a
photo on the front page of his sister and girlfriend at a demonstration the day before, de-
manding that he should be set free. On the inside pages there were other photos of his fa-
mily. 
Twenty-four pages were dedicated to the news. Two of these (p. 12 and p. 14) were dedi-
cated to his neighbors, family and workmates, feature personal details about Blanco, and
the anguish suffered by his family.
EL CORREO ESPAÑO-EL PUEBLO VASCO
Front page featuring a photo of Miguel Angel Blanco, and another of his girlfriend and
sister at a demonstration calling for his freedom. Inside there were another two photos of
Blanco, one with the members of his band, and another with members of his family. 
Sixteen pages were dedicated to the story.
It reported on the emotional state of his family, and gave more personal information about
the victim. 
A) José Antonio Ortega, held for more than 500 days by ETA,
B) Cosme Declaux, held for more than 200 days by ETA, C)  Ma-
ri Atxabal, held for just 3 days by the Guardia Civil…» (Egin, 11th
july, p. 7).
The text plays down the seriousness of ETA kidnappings, com-
pared to treatment at the hands of the security forces. If we allow
ourselves to be guided only by the description given in this article
of kidnapping victims, «they walk out on their own, arrive home,
have a shower, chat to their family, greet their neighbors…» then
we would have to conclude that being kidnapped is not really that
traumatic after all. 
The editorial of Egin dated 13th July, after describing the mur-
der of Blanco as ‘a tragedy’, affirms: «Today Miguel Angel Blan-
co is in the news. Meanwhile the reality of the inhuman and ille-
gal treatment of Basque prisoners is a constant reality…» (Egin,
13th july, p. 7).
In an article which appeared in the same newspaper on the 14th
July, analyzing the facts surrounding the murder using a familiar
metaphor, it states «today the ‘woods’ within which Basque priso-
ners are suffering, the very origin of the situation we are going th-
rough, cannot be seen for the trees. More than six hundred priso-
ners, for whom thousands of citizens have risked their lives with
hunger strikes and demonstrations over the years, with the econo-
mic support of family and friends (Egin, 14th july, p. 7).
The paragraph abounds with the idea of playing down ETA’s
actions as much as possible, shielding itself with the suffering of
others. Here, the murder is «news today», and what is «constant»
is the «inhuman» treatment given to ETA prisoners. This act is so-
mething circumstantial and not worthy of our concern, as it would
prevent us from a clear view of the «woods within which Basque
prisoners are suffering». 
Here Egin is attempting to create a version of the events where
one group suffers more than the other. However, in Deia and El
Correo Español- El Pueblo Vasco, no attempt was made to play
down ETA’s actions by referring to the victims on the other side of
the conflict.
If we examine comments which appeared in Egin throughout
the period of the kidnapping and murder of Miguel Ángel Blan-
co, a belief comes to light which we have denominated an asym-
metrical evaluation of suffering, or the conviction that «it’s
tougher for us than it is for them». Instead of denying the vic-
tims’ suffering, making them appear inhuman and therefore
being counterproductive for the group’s image, their grief is re-
cognized. The group is defined as putting up with much greater
hardships: the suffering of those held by the security forces is
worse than those kidnapped by ETA, the suffering of the families
of ETA members who are held and killed is worse than the suf-
fering of the families of those kidnapped and killed by ETA, and
so on.
Conclusions
Political violence is accompanied by discourses which attempt
to make it legitimate. The end result is not only to justify aggres-
sion against one’s enemy, but also to be considered as victims and
therefore to maintain a positive image, making it possible to ob-
tain as the support of society. In the process of creating this dis-
course, it is important to attribute responsibility to the enemy, to
consider those who have suffered violence, and to refer to the si-
tuation of the group itself. 
Our study demonstrates how these aspects, which are present
when different types of political violence are legitimized, adopt a
different guise when there is violence against the innocent, and
when there is widespread public outcry against this type of action.
As would be expected, there is an external attribution of responsi-
bilities. However, in this particular case, with an innocent victim
and the solidarity of the vast majority of the population, there was
no possible way that he could have been blamed for the situation.
It therefore became the responsibility of the Government, for not
bowing to ETA’s demands. It was responsible on two fronts: firstly,
for the conflict which led to Blanco having been kidnapped by
ETA, and secondly, for his possible death should their conditions
not be agreed to. An attempt was made to absolve ETA of any res-
ponsibility whatsoever for either the kidnapping or the murder.
For obvious reasons, there was no attempt to dehumanize Blan-
co in the information which was given. Instead, Egin attempted to
maintain the logic of the kidnapper’s actions, only referring to him
as a member of a political party which was obliged to comply with
a series of demands. An attempt at de-legitimization was made by
associating him with the political symbol considered as responsi-
ble for the situation of some members of the aggressive group.
This strategy calls for a depersonalization of the victim, by with-
holding any type of information or personal references beyond
party affiliations, preventing the appearance of any feelings of so-
lidarity or identification between the population and victims. In
turn, this emotional distancing softens possible criticisms against
the acts of violence carried out by the group. 
But when this is not the case, and there is a powerful public
backlash which sympathizes with the victim and calls for violen-
ce to end, the group cannot turn to either dehumanizing or to the
egoism of victimization. In this case, our study revealed the exis-
tence of what we have called the «asymmetrical evaluation of ad-
versity». As we mentioned in the introduction, it was to be expec-
ted that when faced with an act of violence against an innocent in-
dividual combined with widespread social outcry, the aggressive
group could not limit itself to the egoism of victimization. In fact,
the results reveal that as well as citing ‘the others’ as being res-
ponsible for violence carried out by their own group, they unite
with public opinion and demonstrate their concern for the fate of
the victim. This attitude of presumed empathy with the victim ma-
kes it possible to present a more affable and ‘humane’ image of the
terrorist group, which is vital in the struggle for public support.
However, if we carefully analyze the range of the group’s posi-
tions, we see that the criminal act itself is never actually questio-
ned. Confronted with the opposing situation, solidarity and the re-
cognition of suffering are designed to emphasize the opponent’s
responsibility, and that the situation of the group is by far the
worst, in an effort to counterbalance condemnation for their cri-
minal actions.
An asymmetrical evaluation of suffering becomes an important
conviction in the effort to maintain support for the group and the
sectors close to it, in response to criticism for acts of violence.
There are several reasons for this: firstly, one of the aspects which
include the belief of an asymmetrical evaluation of suffering is
concern for the suffering of the enemy, which allows the aggres-
sor to offer a more positive image. Secondly, defending the postu-
re that the group’s situation is by far the worse attempts to draw at-
tention away from the act itself onto its opponent’s actions.
Thirdly, as well as attempting to distract attention, emphasizing
the group’s suffering attempts to reduce criticism of the crime.
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Obviously, if these types of attributions and beliefs are up-
held, then the use of violence will continue to be legitimized.
Therefore, one way of dealing with the problem is to try and mo-
dify this discourse. This is no easy task, although it is important
to note that these are not immovable situations: they are created
using the information provided by the media and the exchange of
information between individuals. Little by little, these interac-
tions and exchanges allow a specific definition and interpretation
of reality to be constructed (Mead, 1934; Eyerman and Jamison,
1991). This means it is important that there are discourses and
beliefs within the group’s social context, as well as the sectors
which support it, that reject the use of violence, which humanize
victims and assume that suffering is the same on all sides. The
existence and social visibility of this type of discourse makes it
possible for there to be a ‘mobilization of consensus’ (Klander-
mans, 1988) which calls for an end to all types of political vio-
lence and the opening of inroads which permit a negotiated set-
tlement.
In closing, we should remember that this study is based on the
analysis of one particular case. It has the virtue of shedding light on
a political phenomenon as intriguing as the legitimization of politi-
cal violence against an innocent person, within a specific political
context and by a specific publication. Nevertheless, caution is nee-
ded when considering the importance of the results obtained in this
study. Further studies are needed using a different context, to see
how the media with links to aggressive groups use the same argu-
ment to justify these types of violent situations. The importance of
this topic is evident: the discourses which justify violence are cre-
ated by beliefs based on the attribution of responsibilities, dehuma-
nization of the enemy, and victimization of the in-group.
Note
1 The PP is a conservative party, integrated within the internatio-
nal Christian-Democratic movement. The kidnapping and mur-
der of Miguel Ángel took place when the PP was in power.
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